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Introduction
Today, public awareness of the cruelty, unfairness, and antidemo-
cratic implications of felony disenfranchisement has reached its highest 
point, helping to drive successful reenfranchisement campaigns nation-
wide that are loosening such restrictions and restoring voting rights to 
people who are formerly incarcerated.  Less acknowledged, though, is 
the role that money plays in determining who ultimately can cast a bal-
lot.  Through both direct and indirect mechanisms—ranging from explicit 
requirements that hinge rights restoration on satisfying sentence-relat-
ed fines, fees, and restitution (“legal financial obligations”) to the ways 
that criminal-legal debt may undercut civic participation—the vast 
majority of U.S. states have created a two-tiered system of voting that 
leaves potentially millions of Americans too poor to vote.  As we work 
to identify and address the many ways that legal financial obligations 
(LFOs) are devastating families nationwide, we cannot ignore this basic 
and under-explored impact on our democratic system: The people most 
affected by LFOs are often rendered voiceless—and voteless—in our po-
litical process.
This Article summarizes three ways that LFOs undermine the fun-
damental right to vote.  Part I explores the direct and indirect impact 
of debt-based voting restrictions, including laws that explicitly condition 
postconviction reenfranchisement on satisfying financial obligations and 
those that implicitly do so through mechanisms requiring payment as a 
condition of parole or probation completion.  Part II discusses the vot-
ing barriers faced by individuals who are detained in local jails, which 
constructively deny them the right to vote.  Part III describes the liter-
ature surrounding criminal-legal involvement and civic participation, 
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suggesting that high levels of criminal-legal debt may undermine civic 
participation broadly.  Finally, Part IV offers policy recommendations to 
lower the wealth-based barriers at the intersection of criminal justice and 
our nation’s elections.
I. Debt-Based Voting Barriers
When Amendment 4 passed in November 2018, automatical-
ly restoring voting rights to the vast majority of formerly incarcerated 
Floridians, people in Florida and nationwide celebrated the reenfran-
chisement of an estimated 1.4 million Floridians who had previously been 
denied voting rights due to a felony conviction.1  This historic victory was 
made possible by many individuals who were formerly incarcerated and 
themselves directly affected.2  And it garnered resounding bipartisan sup-
port from 65 percent  of Florida voters.3
In early May 2019, this celebration turned to outrage when Flori-
da lawmakers passed S.B. 7066 to “clarify” that the individuals impacted 
by Amendment 4 would be automatically reenfranchised only if they 
had satisfied all of the LFOs that were associated with their sentences.4 
Since this population owes an average of $1,500 per capita,5  S.B. 7066 is 
projected to disenfranchise more than half a million people.  Indeed, an 
estimate from an expert analyst suggests it could disenfranchise as many 
as a million people or more.6
This unfolding Florida saga provides a poignant and timely ex-
ample of how debt-based voting barriers are disenfranchising the very 
people whom reenfranchisement efforts are designed to help.  But debt-
based voting restrictions are not just a Florida problem: Thirty states 
1. Lori Rozsa, ‘A Joyous Day’ Ahead as 1.4 million Florida Ex-Felons Have Voting 
Rights Restored, Wash. Post (Jan. 5, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://www. washingtonpost.
com/national/a-joyous-day-ahead-as-14-million-florida-ex-felons-have-voting-
rights-restored/2019/01/05/58650ee2-106f-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GUB8-UZXD].
2. Ari Berman, “This Is What Democracy Is All About”: Florida Ex-Felons Can Fi-
nally Register to Vote, Mother Jones, (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.motherjones.
com/politics/2019/01/florida-voting-rights-ex-felons-register-amendment-four-
voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/T6P9-ALY6].
3. Sarah Almukhtar et al., Florida Election Results, N.Y. Times (May 15, 2019, 
2:09 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results- 
florida-elections.html [https://perma.cc/2B76-YGCF].
4. S.B. 7066, 2019 Leg., 121st Sess. (Fla. 2019).
5. Cecile Scoon, Florida’s Change to Amendment 4 is a Travesty and a Transgres-
sion of the People’s Will, Wash. Post, (May 15, 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/floridas-change-to-amendment-4-is-travesty-
and-a-transgression-of-the-peoples-will/2019/05/15/3b859318-75bf-11e9-b7ae-
390de4259661_story.html [https://perma.cc/BV3T-8LE6].
6. See Gray Rohrer, Amendment 4: Professor Testifies Law Prevents 80% of Ex-Fel-
ons from Registering to Vote, Orlando Sentinel, (Oct. 7, 2019, 4:58 PM), https://
www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-amendment-4- federal-court-20191007-
fwvhhgc7q5htnf6clo5jszxjz4-story.html [https://perma.cc/AA3D-THGT].
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nationwide currently impose some debt-based barrier to voting.7  Under-
standing these policies, as well as their implications for the low-income, 
Black, and Latinx individuals who are disproportionately affected, is es-
sential for restoring democratic access.
A. Criminal Legal Debt
Today, an estimated 10 million people in the United States owe more 
than $50 billion in fines and fees that are related to criminal convictions.8 
These financial penalties are imposed alongside other punishments such 
as probation, custodial incarceration, and community service, and vary 
markedly between jurisdictions.  However, LFOs generally fall into three 
categories: restitution, fines, and fees.9
Restitution involves court-ordered payments that are intended to 
compensate the crime victim and make her “whole” for her losses.  How-
ever, in some cases—such as drug offenses and other cases that do not 
have any clear victims or where the victim’s harm was entirely mitigat-
ed—the “restitution” ordered is to the state.10  And the amounts involved 
are often staggering: In some cases, restitution can total hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of dollars.11  For an individual whose employ-
ment prospects are hampered by a criminal conviction, this amount is 
one that they might never fully pay.
Criminal fines are financial penalties that are intended to pun-
ish the criminal defendant.  Usually authorized by statute, these fines 
can be either mandatory or discretionary, and may prescribe a mini-
mum and/or maximum dollar amount.  For example, in Alabama, drug 
trafficking offenses require a mandatory $50,000 fine—an amount 
that is objectively unaffordable for most criminal defendants who are 
7. Campaign Legal Ctr., Can’t Pay, Can’t Vote: A National Survey on the Mod-
ern Poll Tax 41–50 (2019), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/
CLC_CPCV_Report_Final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT53-N2VB].
8. Douglas N. Evans, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, Research & Evalua-
tion Center, The Debt Penalty: Exposing the Financial Barriers to Offend-
er Reintegration 7 (2014), https://jjrec.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/debtpenal-
ty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KST-R6F7].
9. For additional information on different types of LFOs, see Rachel L. McLean & 
Michael D. Thompson, Council of State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., Repaying Debts 
(2007), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/repaying_
debts_full_report-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FJD-QHTS]; Monica Llorente, Crim-
inalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, A.B.A. Child. Rts. Litig. Arti-
cles (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/
childrens-rights/articles/2016/criminalizing-poverty-fines-fees-costs [https:// 
perma.cc/ZBT7-7CZ9].
10. See Cortney Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 137–138 
(2014) (describing restitution awards to third parties and governmental agen-
cies).
11. See, e.g., Restitution, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Alaska, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ak/restitution [https://perma.cc/YFK5-5BY9] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (“In federal cases, restitution in the hundreds of thou-
sands or millions of dollars is not unusual.”).
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overwhelmingly indigent.12  Although some states are beginning to re-
think their fine frameworks—by, for example, building systems that take 
into account an individual’s financial resources—many states impose 
standard fines regardless of an individual’s financial circumstances.13  The 
result is a regressive system that imposes disproportionately more finan-
cial hardship and punishment on low-income individuals.
The final category—fees—actually encompasses a sprawling set of 
criminal-legal fees, costs, surcharges, and other assessments that are im-
posed on criminal defendants as a way to raise revenue.  Unlike fines, 
which purportedly have a punitive purpose, fees are broadly designed 
to raise money to fund the administration of courts, other aspects of the 
criminal-legal system, or unrelated municipal services.14  In Florida, many 
court-related functions are funded entirely by these fees and costs.15 
As a result, criminal defendants are charged for the very system that 
is detaining and prosecuting them, including charges for investigation, 
prosecution, drug testing, electronic monitoring, arrest warrants, payment 
plans, probation supervision, community service, expert witnesses, med-
ical care, nightly stays in jail, and even their public defense.16  In some 
places, people must pay a fee just to apply for a public defender.17  In 
Florida, felony convictions usually trigger a minimum of approximately 
$698 in court costs and fees if a defendant is represented by a court-ap-
pointed lawyer.18
These LFOs add up quickly, particularly in jurisdictions that as-
sess fees for late payments or charge interest.  In one study, the average 
family of a returning citizen owed approximately $13,600 in fines and 
fees alone.19  The result is a debt-load that many formerly incarcerated 
individuals may never be able to pay.  In fact, the median earnings of an 
individual who was formerly incarcerated is $10,090 annually—approx-
imately $3000 less than he or she probably owes in debt.20  And these 
12. See Ala. Code § 13-A-12-231 (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-21).
13. See Matthew Menendez et. al., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Steep Costs 
of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines 9 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/2019-11/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final5.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D2N5-PEK5].
14. See infra Subpart IV.A.
15. See Fla. Const. art. V, § 14; Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745, 752 (Fla. 2010) (“[C]
ourt-related functions of the clerks’ offices are to be funded entirely from filing 
fees and service charges . . . .”).
16. Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees (2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ default/
files/2019-08/Report_The%20Hidden-Costs-Florida%27s-Criminal- Justice-
Fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPR7-4KRX].
17. Id. at 7.
18. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F.Supp.3d 1284, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
19. Saneta deVuono-powell et al., Ella Baker Ctr. for Human rights, For-
ward Together & Research Action Design, Who Pays?  The True Cost of In-
carceration on Families 9 (2015), http://ellabakercenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
downloads/who-pays.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3SU-YL8B].
20. Adam Looney & Nicholas Turner, Brookings Inst., Work and Opportunity 
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courtimposed debts fall disproportionately on minority and poor com-
munities who are often least able to pay them.21  These racialized impacts, 
as well as the proliferation and expansion of criminal-legal debt, is dis-
cussed in more detail infra in Part III on “pocketbook policing.”  Here, 
the key takeaway is this: Conditioning voting rights restoration on full 
payment of one’s LFOs can result in permanent disenfranchisement for 
poor and minority individuals who cannot afford to pay.
B. The Landscape of Debt-Based Voting Barriers
At present, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have 
laws limiting the voting rights of individuals convicted of felonies.22 
All  forty-eight states provide a mechanism for voting rights resto-
ration—although some only provide a discretionary route via clemency 
or legislative relief—but most states either explicitly or implicitly hinge 
voting rights restoration on paying LFOs.23  Indeed, a recent report con-
ducted by Campaign Legal Center concluded that at least thirty states 
Before and After Incarceration 7 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp- 
content/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H6TC-7TKT].
21. See Evans, supra note 8, at 7, 11; McLean & Thompson, supra note 9, at 8 (“In one 
study, three-fourths of people released from prison owing child support, restitu-
tion, and supervision fees reported having difficulty paying off these debts.”).
22. Two states—Maine and Vermont—do not disenfranchise felons.  See Jean 
Chung, The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer 
(2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ Felony-
Disenfranchisement-Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CVU-HLPB].
23. This Article relies upon a recent study conducted by Campaign Legal Center 
(CLC), supra note 7, where Danielle Lang, a coauthor of this Article, directs 
the voting rights program.  Beth Colgan has also written an authoritative piece 
on this topic, see Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 
Vand L. Rev. 55 (2019).  Professor Colgan correctly notes that arguably every 
state that has felony disenfranchisement has legal restrictions that could lead to 
wealth-based disenfranchisement.  Id. at 79–80.  However, the study conduct-
ed by CLC used a different methodology for determining which states pose the 
greatest risk of wealth-based disenfranchisement.  First, the CLC study did not 
take into account clemency procedures that look at outstanding LFOs unless a 
pardon is the only available option for voting rights restoration.  This is because 
where automatic restoration is available, it will be the primary mechanism for 
restoring voting rights for most people.  Indeed, most people will become eli-
gible for automatic restoration before they meet the guidelines for a clemen-
cy-based restoration of voting rights.  Second, the CLC study categorizes states 
that enfranchise individuals upon release from incarceration as states without 
the modern poll tax.  Colgan’s article argues that even these states could lead 
to wealth-based disenfranchisement because parole or probation might be re-
voked—and the individual may return to prison—because of failure to pay.  Id. 
Under Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), a state cannot constitutionally 
reincarcerate a person on parole or probation for failure to pay LFOs without 
consideration of their ability to pay.  Thus, a state acting constitutionally will not 
disenfranchise individuals under these regimes unless there is a willful failure to 
pay.  This Article addresses the common violations of Bearden that lead to dis-
enfranchisement, infra Part II on jail-based disenfranchisement.
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implicitly or explicitly condition voting rights on paying LFOs—a mod-
ern-day poll tax in all but name.24
1. Explicit LFO Requirements
The most obvious form of this modern-day poll tax is the explicit 
requirement that LFOs be paid prior to regaining voting rights.  Eight 
states have such an explicit requirement in their election laws, though 
each state’s policy has its own idiosyncrasies.25  Alabama requires pay-
ment of all LFOs (including restitution, fines, and fees) imposed at the 
time of sentencing for disqualifying felony convictions involving moral 
turpitude, but the state excludes payment of LFOs that were imposed 
after sentencing or imposed for non-disqualifying felony convictions.26  In 
Arizona, people who have one felony conviction have their voting rights 
restored after sentence completion, including parole and probation, and 
payment of all outstanding restitution.27  But the state does not require 
payment of fines or fees.28  In Arkansas, a citizen seeking voting rights 
restoration must pay all LFOs—including those imposed after sentenc-
ing—and bears the burden of providing proof of such payment, as well as 
her completion of her sentence, to the local registrar.29  As noted above, 
Florida requires payment of all LFOs imposed at conviction if they are 
included within the “four corners of the sentencing document.”30  And in 
Tennessee, citizens must not only have paid all restitution and court costs 
(but not fines), but also be current on child support.31  Tennessee is the 
only state in the United States to have such a requirement.32
While an LFO requirement is not explicit in Georgia’s election code, 
an Attorney General opinion makes clear that to regain voting rights, 
Georgia citizens with past convictions must pay statutory fines that are 
imposed as part of the sentence, but they need not pay restitution, costs, 
or fines connected with parole or probation.33  In Connecticut, curiously, 
the election code requires payment of fines for voting rights restoration 
only for those with out-of-state or federal convictions.34  Finally, the state 
24. Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7, at 41–50.
25. Id. at 21.
26. Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1 (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-38).
27. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-907 (formerly cited as § 13-912, renumbered and amended 
by L. 2019, ch. 149, § 7) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 27, 2020, 54th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess.).
28. See id.  Arizona recently amended its law to remove the requirement of payment 
of all fines in addition to restitution.  See H.R. 2080, 54 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2019), https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/GetDocumentPdf/470934.
29. Ark. Const. amend. 51, § 11(a)(4), (d)(2)(A)–(B).
30. S.B. 7066 § 25, 2019 Leg., 121st Sess. (Fla. 2019).
31. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 532, Mar. 
10, 2020, 111th Tenn. Gen. Assemb., 2020 1st Reg. Sess.).
32. See Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7, at 41–50 (listing state LFO-related stat-
utes).
33. Ga. Att’y Gen., Advisory Opinion on Voting Rights Restoration No. 84-33 (May 
24, 1984).
34. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 9-46a (West, Westlaw current through Pub. Act 20-1). 
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of Washington has a unique system wherein the right to vote is provision-
ally restored upon completion of incarceration and parole, but the right 
to vote can be revoked if a court finds that the citizen has willfully failed 
to pay outstanding LFOs.35
In addition to the eight states described above, two states that re-
tain a permanent felony disenfranchisement model require payment 
of LFOs in order to qualify for discretionary rights restoration through 
clemency.  In both Iowa and Kentucky, the only way to regain the right 
to vote after a felony conviction is through executive clemency.  In Iowa, 
the Governor has instructed that individuals can only apply for voting 
rights restoration if they have either paid their LFOs or are currently on 
a payment plan for their LFOs.36  Likewise, in order to apply for rights 
restoration in Kentucky, citizens cannot have any outstanding restitution 
and the Governor also considers outstanding fines and fees in exercising 
his discretion.37
2. LFO-Related Administrative Barriers to Voting
As one can imagine, these complicated requirements are not only 
onerous, see supra Subpart II.A and infra Subpart IV.A but create sub-
stantial confusion and bureaucratic difficulties.  In the words of Judge 
Hinkle in the Northern District of Florida, the result can be an “admin-
istrative nightmare”38 and result in spillover disenfranchisement effects 
even on those who should be eligible under the state’s requirements.  A 
few examples illustrate this point.
In Alabama, only LFOs imposed at sentencing should be 
disqualifying.39  But the Board of Pardons and Paroles often errs in ad-
ministering this requirement, informing potential voters that they must 
In early 2019, the Connecticut House of Representatives introduced and passed 
a bill that would have removed the financial restrictions and reenfranchised all 
citizens, postincarceration, regardless of whether their conviction was in-state, 
out-of-state, or federal.  However, the Senate did not vote on it before the end of 
the January session.  See H.B. 7213 , 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2019/TOB/h/pdf/2019HB-07213-R00-HB.pdf; see also 
Substitute H.B. No. 7160, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019) (as amend-
ed by H. Amend. Sched. A), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2019/FC/pdf/2019HB-07160-
R001015-FC.PDF.
35. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29A.08.520 (West, Westlaw current though Ch. 92 of 
the 2020 Wash. Leg. Reg. Sess.).
36. Voting Rights Restoration, Iowa Off. of the Governor, https://governor.iowa.
gov/services/voting-rights-restoration (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
37. See Div. of Prob. & Parole, Ky. Dep’t of Corr., Application for Restoration of 
Civil Rights (Rev. Mar. 2020), https://corrections.ky.gov/Probation-and-Parole/
Documents/Restoration%20of%20Civil%20Rights%20Application%20Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B7DX-8A3B].
38. Lawrence Mower, Lawmakers Made Amendment 4 an ‘Administrative Night-
mare,’ Federal Judge Says, Tampa Bay Times (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.tampa-
bay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/10/08/lawmakers-made-amendment-4-an- 
administrative-nightmare-federal-judge-says [https://perma.cc/J3R5-PSAM].
39. Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1(3) (West, Westlaw through Act 2020-38).
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pay all outstanding LFOs, including late penalties, in order to qualify 
for voting rights restoration.40  As a result, Alfonso Tucker was wrongly 
disenfranchised in the 2018 midterm elections.41  At the time of his con-
viction in 1992, Mr. Tucker was assessed $1,515 in fines and fees.42  He 
signed up for a payment plan and paid $1,511 towards his fines and fees.43 
But because he failed to pay just four dollars of the total amount, the 
state imposed a late fee of $135.44  When Mr. Tucker applied for voting 
rights restoration, he was informed he could not regain his right to vote 
until he paid the late penalty.45  He did not have the money to pay the full 
$139 and thus lost the opportunity to vote in 2018.46  By law, Mr. Tucker 
should have been required only to pay the four dollars remaining from 
his original fines and fees to be eligible for rights restoration.47
In Florida, state officials as of yet have been unable to define which 
LFOs fall within the “four corners of the sentencing document” or even 
what “the sentencing document” referred to in the statute is.48  As of now, 
the Secretary of State has no plan for the uniform implementation or en-
forcement of SB7066’s requirements.49  And records of outstanding LFOs 
are not readily available to impacted Floridians.50  Despite having a team 
of lawyers to assist him, at least one of the Plaintiffs in a case challeng-
ing the LFO requirement in Florida has still not been able to obtain the 
necessary records of his decades-old convictions to ascertain what LFOs 
he must pay in order to vote.51  Many others remain confused as to what 
precisely they owe, given inconsistencies in the records and the lack of 
disaggregation of LFOs imposed as a result of felony and misdemeanor 
convictions.52
In Georgia, there is significant deviation in state and local officials’ 
explanations of what is required for a person with a conviction to restore 
40. Alfonso Tucker, Alabama Took My Voting Rights Away for Owing 4 Dollars, 
Campaign Legal Ctr. (Apr. 5, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/story/alabama-
took-my-voting-rights-away-owing-4-dollars [https://perma.cc/V2ZE-57AX]; 
Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7 at 10.
41. Tucker, supra note 40.
42. Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7 at 10.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 22–23, Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 
(11th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-14551);  see also Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary In-
junction, Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F.Supp.3d 1284 (N.D. Fla 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-300), 
ECF No. 98-1.
49. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 48.
50. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F.Supp.3d 1284, 1306-07 (N.D. Fla. 2019).  In some states, 
this modern-day poll tax is compounded by the state charging people with con-
victions to obtain their own criminal records identifying their convictions and 
outstanding LFOs.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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his or her voting rights.  Despite the Attorney General opinion explain-
ing that only statutory fines must be paid, many county officials routinely 
inform people with convictions that they must pay all fines, fees, and resti-
tution to register to vote.53  Campaign Legal Center has identified similar 
misinformation in Connecticut, where some officials have improperly 
expanded the fines requirement—which, according to Connecticut law, 
only applies to people who have out-of-state convictions—to people who 
have in-state convictions.54
It should not take a lawyer for a person to determine her eligi-
bility to vote.  But the rights restoration schemes in many states are so 
complicated that, in practice, a law degree is required.  So long as these 
laws remain complex and difficult to navigate, election officials are like-
ly to make mistakes and misinform potential voters—and voters, facing 
this maze of rules, are likely to assume their ineligibility and remain 
disenfranchised.
3. Implicit LFO Requirements
Twenty states have built implicit poll taxes into their provisions 
for voting rights restoration.55  These states do not explicitly require that 
individuals pay fines and fees to restore their right to vote, but they do re-
quire completion of parole and/or probation before a person can regain 
her voting rights.56  Since the length of a person’s parole and/or probation 
sentence may depend on whether the person has complied with all super-
vision conditions, including payment of LFOs, the right to vote in these 
states can be delayed through extended parole and/or probation because 
of an inability to pay off legal debts.57
Conditioning voting rights restoration on completion of parole and/
or probation inevitably creates the potential for wealth-based disenfran-
chisement.  For example, in Missouri, individuals may not vote unless they 
53. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Columbus, Ga. Consol. Gov’t, Elections & Registra-
tion: Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.columbusga.gov/elections/elect-
FAQ.htm [https://perma.cc/U7NF-RB5X] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“Can a fel-
on vote?  Yes, once all aspects of your felony sentence is completed to include 
probation, restitution, or fines.”); Wilkinson Cty., Ga., Elections and Registra-
tions, https://wilkinsoncounty.net/index.php/elections-and-registrations [https://
perma.cc/5HSQ-L9VQ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) (“You may NOT register if 
you . . . [h]ave been convicted of a felony and you are currently serving your sen-
tence, this includes any fines and probation.”).
54. Email from Hope Metcalf, Supervising Attorney, Rule of Law Clinic at Yale Law 
School, to Peggy Reeves, Conn. Asst. to the Sec’y of the State for Elections (Oct. 
29, 2018), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/Follow-Up%20
Letter%20to%20Peggy%20Reeves.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V3K-XVCT].
55. Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7, at 25.  The states with implicit poll taxes are 
Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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have completed parole and probation.58  Missouri also requires individ-
uals to pay any restitution imposed as a result of their conviction before 
they are released from supervision.59  If restitution is not paid within the 
original term of the probation, the court will impose the maximum term 
for probation allowed for that offense.60  Similarly, a person will not be 
released from parole until restitution is paid, or until the maximum term 
for parole under that offense is served.61  This wealthbased prolongment 
of supervision is not limited to restitution.  Completion of probation and 
parole may also be conditioned on the payment of supervision fees of up 
to sixty dollars per month.62
Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all have similar statutory 
frameworks, requiring that individuals pay certain LFOs before they may 
be released from probation or parole.63  These states require payment of 
LFOs as a condition for securing early release and/or create the risk that 
probation or parole will be extended because LFOs are outstanding.64 
In some jurisdictions, “pay-only” probation specifically refers to proba-
tion that lasts until the individual can satisfy his or her LFOs—and that 
exists only because the individual has not paid his or her LFOs rather 
than for any other reason.65  In Georgia, “pay-only probation” is explic-
itly recognized in statute.66  Anyone on “pay-only” probation will not be 
considered to have completed his or her sentence because they remain 
on probation.  Also, over and above these statutory requirements, some 
Departments of Corrections have policies requiring payment of all LFOs 
to be eligible for early release from supervision.  For example, the Wis-
consin Department of Corrections states that people with convictions are 
only eligible for early discharge from probation if they have “[f]ulfilled 
all financial obligations his or her victims, the court, and the department, 
including the payment of any fine, forfeiture, fee or surcharge, or order 
of restitution.”67
58. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.690 (West, Westlaw through 100th Gen. Assemb., 2019 
1st Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Campaign Legal Ctr., supra note 7, at 41–50.
64. See id.
65. See Chris Albin-Lackey, Human Rights Watch, Profiting from Probation, 
America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry 25–27 (2014), https://
www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded- 
probation-industry [https://perma.cc/G94Z-EJ69].
66. See Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-103 (West, Westlaw through L. 2020, Act 322).
67. Community Corrections—General Information, Wisc. Dep’t of Corr. (em-
phasis added), https://doc.wi.gov/Pages/AboutDOC/CommunityCorrections/ 
GeneralInformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/5MKG-53VQ] (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020).
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All of these schemes create a possibility that an inability to pay 
LFOs will prolong disenfranchisement.  Indeed, it is well-established 
that inability to pay LFOs often does prolong supervision and thus 
disenfranchisement.68
C. Legal Challenges to the Modern-Day Poll Tax
The evolution of this modern-day poll tax is surprising given that it 
is at odds with a basic premise of our modern post–civil rights era democ-
racy: Wealth should not be a factor in access to the ballot box.69
This was not always the case.  The U.S. Supreme Court first heard a 
challenge to poll taxes in 1937: A white male citizen in Georgia brought 
suit after he was not allowed to register to vote for declining to pay the 
tax.70  In Breedlove v. Suttles, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the payment 
of poll taxes as a prerequisite of voting, finding that poll taxes did not 
“deny any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”71  Rather, the Court viewed poll taxes as “familiar and reasonable 
regulation[s] long enforced in many states  .  .  .  .”72  Georgia abolished 
its poll tax in 1945, but Breedlove remained good law until it was over-
turned in 1966.73
Poll taxes were abolished nationwide in the 1960s during the height 
of the Civil Rights Movement.  The TwentyFourth Amendment, ratified 
in 1964, prohibited the use of poll taxes in federal elections.74  Four states 
continued to require citizens to pay to vote in state elections until 1966.75 
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the use of poll taxes in state elections violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.76  Because “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not 
germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral pro-
cess,” the Court found that poll taxes constitute invidious discrimination 
against individuals based on socioeconomic status.77  The Court explicitly 
overruled Breedlove,78 holding that “once the franchise [has been] grant-
ed to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause.”79
Harper is not the only line of Supreme Court precedent relevant 
to the wealth restrictions at issue in this Part.  A long line of precedent 
68. See Albin-Lackey, supra note 65, at 27–30.
69. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
70. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
71. Id. at 283.
72. Id.
73. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
74. U.S. Const. amend. XXIV, § 1.  The Amendment guarantees that the right to vote 
in federal elections “shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
75. Harper, 383 U.S. at 680.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 668.
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id. at 665.
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established that the state cannot apply penalties or withhold access to 
a significant interest because a person cannot afford to pay LFOs.  To 
do so “would be little more than punishing a person for his poverty”80 
in violation of “the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”81  For this reason, the Supreme Court has held that indi-
gent defendants have the right to receive a free transcript to enable an 
appeal of their conviction, the state cannot revoke probation for failure 
to pay a fine or fee that the person is unable to pay, and the state can-
not deny the right to an appeal of revocation of parental rights simply 
because a person cannot afford to pay the requisite fees.82  All of these 
cases—from Griffin and Harper to Bearden and M.L.B.—establish the 
principle that when the state confers a substantial right, it cannot do so 
“in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on ac-
count of their poverty.”83
Nonetheless, until recently, wealth restrictions on voting for people 
with convictions have been left unscathed.  Two prior cases challenging 
these restrictions in Arizona and Tennessee unfortunately failed,84 leav-
ing the state of the law on this issue in limbo and many affected voters 
without much hope of a change.  But the tide may be turning.  In Thomp-
son v. Alabama, the district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss 
a challenge of the LFO-based voting restriction as applied to people 
who are unable to pay their outstanding LFOs.85  The district court dis-
tinguished the Arizona case, Harvey v. Brewer, which did not raise an 
inability to pay claim, and cast doubt on the state’s interest in imposing 
such a requirement.86
Moreover, the court in the recent challenges to the new Flor-
ida LFO requirement recently issued a landmark decision in its order 
granting a preliminary injunction by holding unequivocally that it is un-
constitutional for a state to “deny the right to vote to a felon who would 
be allowed to vote but for the failure to pay amounts the felon has been 
genuinely unable to pay.”87  Moreover, the court cast considerable doubt 
on the state’s ability to condition the right to vote on payment of various 
administrative court fees and costs without running afoul of the Twen-
ty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on requiring payment of a “poll tax 
or any other tax” to vote.88  Hopefully, this turn in the courts will soon 
80. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983).
81. Id. at 673.
82. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17–18 (1956); Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671; M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123–24 (1996).
83. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
84. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 
F.3d 742, 746–50 (6th Cir. 2010).
85. Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F.Supp.3d 1313 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
86. Id. at 1332–33 (citing Harvey, 605 F.3d 1067).
87. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F.Supp.3d 1284, 1304 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)).
88. Id. at 1290, 1305–06.
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be the death knell of this modern-day poll tax.  As the judge in Jones v. 
DeSantis explained:
Suppose a state adopted a statute automatically restoring the right 
to vote for felons with a net worth of $100,000 or more but not for 
other felons.  Would anyone contend this was constitutional?  One 
hopes not.  An official who adopts a constitutional theory that would 
approve such a statute needs a new constitutional theory.89
II. Jail-Based Disenfranchisement90
Alongside laws that explicitly hinge voting eligibility on satisfying 
criminal-legal debts, essentially all states have laws, policies, or practices 
that effectively disenfranchise a large swathe of eligible voters: people 
detained in local jails.91
The majority of the nearly 750,000 people filling local jails na-
tionwide92 can legally cast a ballot.93  While some individuals may have 
immigration statuses or previous felony convictions that preclude vot-
ing eligibility, most people incarcerated are merely detained pretrial or 
serving misdemeanor sentences that do not result in legal disenfranchise-
ment.94  And yet, as practical matter, few people serving jail sentences 
are able to cast a ballot.  As explored in this Part, for many people who 
are detained pretrial or serving misdemeanor sentences, the barriers to 
casting a ballot may be state and local policies and practices that inhib-
it incarcerated individuals from successfully casting absentee ballots or 
in-person ballots at the jail.  For others, the restriction may be explicit: In 
Ohio, for example, where the Campaign Legal Center, Dēmos, and the 
Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center have filed suit, a person 
arrested a few days before Election Day cannot get an absentee ballot 
89. Id. at 1302.
90. There is often confusion around the difference between jails and prisons.  Al-
though definition may vary by state, typically, jails are under the jurisdiction of 
a local government and are used to confine people detained pretrial or those 
convicted of minor crimes, usually those serving one year or less.  See Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, FAQ Detail (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) https://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 [https://perma.cc/WYR8-P76L].  Prisons are state or 
federal facilities that house people convicted of felonies who are serving more 
than one year.  Id.
91. See generally Dana Paikowsky, Jails as Polling Places: Living Up to the Obliga-
tion to Enfranchise the Voters We Jail, 54 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 
829 (2019).
92. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarcera-
tion: The Whole Pie 2019 2 (2019) (explaining that on any given day, there are 
731,000 people held in local jails).
93. Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates in 2016 2 (2018).
94. In a few states, including Alabama and Mississippi, only certain felony convic-
tions are disenfranchising.  See  Chung, supra note 22.  Felony Disenfranchise-
ment: A Primer (2019).  This means that otherwise eligible voters held in prison 
for non-disqualifying felonies are able to register and vote while serving time in 
prison.
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because pretrial detention is not an “emergency” that warrants an excep-
tion to the three-day cutoff.95
At first glance, this “jail-based disenfranchisement” may not appear 
to be wealth-based, but the disproportionate effects on the poor become 
apparent on examining the jail population and our current money bail 
system.  Over the last forty years, our jail population has grown sub-
stantially because people are too poor to afford money-bail, are serving 
jail time because they could not pay a financial obligation, or are swept 
into a misdemeanor system that disproportionately punishes crimes of 
poverty.96  In this way, jail-based disenfranchisement is fundamentally a 
wealth-based restriction on the franchise.  The following Subpart will ex-
plore this argument in depth: by first examining wealth-based detention 
in U.S. jails; and second identifying the main factors driving jail-based 
disenfranchisement.
A. Wealth-Based Detention in U.S. Jails
The U.S. jail population cannot be understood without understand-
ing the role that money plays in determining who is incarcerated and why. 
This Subpart—though certainly not an exhaustive account of how the 
U.S. criminal-legal system criminalizes poverty—summarizes two mech-
anisms through which wealth directly determines who sits behind bars.
1. Money-Bail
Nearly two-thirds of the jail population is legally innocent and 
simply awaiting trial, amounting to about half a million people nation-
wide.97  In many cases, these individuals are incarcerated because they 
could not afford to pay a preset amount (“money-bail”) set according 
to a bond schedule.98  This epidemic of pretrial detention, most of which 
uses the “money-bail” system, has been a key driver of U.S. jail popula-
tion growth: Since 2000, pretrial detention has driven 95 percent of U.S. 
jail population growth.99
The money-bail system usually operates as follows.  Following ar-
rest, an individual is set a predetermined money-bail that is based on the 
particular charge.100  In setting this amount, judges generally do not con-
duct an individualized inquiry into whether the person can pay the sum 
95. Ohio is Depriving Late-Jailed Citizens from Exercising Constitutional Rights, 
Lawsuit Says, Campaign Legal Center (Nov. 6, 2018), https://campaignlegal.
org/press-releases/ohio-depriving-late-jailed-citizens-exercising- constitutional-
rights-lawsuit-says [https://perma.cc/5CWK-G6MV]
96. Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prison Policy Initiative, Detaining the 
Poor (2016).
97. Zeng, supra note 93.
98. Rabuy & Kopf, supra note 96.
99. Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 2014 1 (2015).
100. Adureh Onyekwere, How Cash Bail Works, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 
10, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-cash-
bail-works [https://perma.cc/A3KT-NECV]
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specified.101  The result is that individuals with money can pay the pre-
determined sum and walk free, but individuals without enough money 
remain incarcerated until they plead guilty or the case is otherwise ad-
judicated.102  And people can be and are held pretrial for months, even 
years, at a time; indeed, in Hinds County, Mississippi, the average length 
of detention for people in the county jail is 469 days—over a year and 
three months.103
Over the past few decades, the use of money-bail has increased dra-
matically in the United States.  A study of the 75 largest counties found 
that from 1990 to 2009, the proportion of felony pretrial releases carrying 
financial conditions grew from 37 percent to 61percent.104  Compounding 
this trend, the average amount of money-bail has doubled over twenty 
years, far outstripping the rate of inflation.105  Now more than 70 percent 
of felony defendants receive money-bail that is $5000 or more.106
Given the sums involved, it is no wonder that the pretrial popula-
tion now hovers around a half a million.107  Nationwide, four in ten adults 
would either not be able to cover a $400 emergency expense or would 
have to sell something or borrow money.108  And, for people arrested, 
access to immediate cash is particularly challenging.  Approximately 80 
percent of people charged cannot afford a lawyer and must use court-ap-
pointed counsel.109  In New York City, only 26 percent of defendants who 
received bail under $500 posted bail at arraignment, and only 7 percent 
made bail that was set at $5000.110  In a recent study covering Phila-
delphia and Miami-Dade, the typical pretrial arrestee earned less than 
$7000 in the year proceeding arrest111 and only half could post bail that 
was $5000 or less.112
Wealth-based pretrial detention deeply harms all those who are ar-
rested and cannot satisfy a financial condition that is needed to secure 
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Mississippi Jail Records: May 2019—Days in Jail per County Map, MacArthur 
Justice Center, https://www.msjaildata.com/data/201905-may-2019/length-of-
stay-per-county-map [https://perma.cc/6632-WW92] (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
104. Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties, 2009—Statistical Tables 1 (2013).
105. Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, 
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 201 (2018).
106. See id.
107. Onyekwere, supra note 100.
108. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report on the Econom-
ic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017 2 (2018).
109. Christopher Zoukis, Indigent Defense in America: An Affront to Justice, Crim. Le-
gal News (Mar. 16, 2018) https://www.criminallegalnews.org/news/2018/mar/16/
indigent-defense-america-affront-justice [https://perma.cc/55UW-C6CS].
110. Mary T. Phillips, N.Y.C. Crim. Just. Agency, Inc., A Decade of Bail Research 
in New York City 51 tbl.7 (2012).
111. Dobbie et al., supra note 105, at 201–02.
112. Id. at 202.
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pretrial freedom, but the impacts are particularly extreme for Black and 
Latinx communities.  In general, people of color are both arrested more 
and have higher bonds set compared to white people for allegedly com-
mitting the same offense.113  One study analyzing data from Philadelphia 
and Miami found that for those who could have almost as easily been 
released as detained (i.e., were “on the margin” between release and 
detention), white defendants were approximately 22–23 percent more 
likely to be rearrested than Black defendants.114  This discrepancy implies 
harsher treatment of Black defendants pretrial.115
In recent years, courts have overwhelmingly ruled that this wealth-
based pretrial detention violates the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.116  Due to these decisions and 
increased advocacy nationwide, many states are reforming their systems 
to ensure that financial conditions are no longer—or are less of—a barri-
er to pretrial freedom.117  While wealth-based pretrial detention systems 
remain in effect, though, the voting implications are clear: People who 
can pay money-bail will ordinarily not experience the disenfranchising 
effects of pretrial detention while people who cannot satisfy a financial 
obligation, set using a bond schedule that has limited relationship to their 
circumstances, will be disenfranchised notwithstanding their constitu-
tional right to vote.118
2. Failure to Pay
Outside of the pretrial context, many individuals are jailed simply 
because they were financially unable to satisfy a court-ordered debt.119 
The debt-related incarceration cycle generally begins when a person re-
ceives a fine for a driving-related or quality-of-life offense, such as saggy 
pants, speeding, walking in the roadway, or having dogs that barked too 
much.120  This is no exaggeration: In Amarillo, Texas, a woman spent fif-
ty-two days in jail because she received a “barking ticket” for a rescue 
dog and was unable to pay.121
113. David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1885, 1917–
1920 (2018).
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
117. See e.g. SPLC Prompts Alabama Cities to Reform Discriminatory Bail Practic-
es, Southern Poverty Law Center (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.splcenter.org/
news/2016/12/06/splc-prompts-alabama-cities-reform-discriminatory-bail-prac-
tices [https://perma.cc/2VXU-8SSA] (noting that “[a]s of December 13, 2017, a 
total of 78 Alabama cities have reformed their bail practices”).
118. See O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
119. See Am. Civ. Liberties Union, In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New 
Debtors’ Prisons (2010).
120. See Mark Garrison, How the Poor are Ending Up Stuck in Modern-day Debt-
ors’ Prisons, Marketplace.org (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.marketplace.
org/2016/08/17/debtor-prisons-vice [https://perma.cc/9S5K-MLFZ].
121. Johnathan Silver, Advocates Hope to End Policy in Texas of Jailing Poor for 
Unpaid Fines, Texas Trib. (Mar. 14, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.
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These fines may total hundreds or even thousands even though the 
person is too poor to pay.122  When the person fails to pay the fine or 
is late on a court-ordered payment plan, the judge may issue an arrest 
warrant.123  Still worse, the amount owed only increases during their time 
in detention.  In Washington, for example, court debt carries 12 percent 
interest.124  And in many jurisdictions, local officials outsource debt to 
private companies that charge high fees to supervise poor debtors.125  This 
outsourcing further increases individuals’ debt-loads.126
The number of such debt-based incarcerations is striking.  In Ben-
ton County, Washington, in 2013, approximately one-quarter of people in 
jail serving misdemeanor sentences were detained because they had not 
paid their court debt.127  In Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 2013, nearly 30 percent 
of jail bookings involved failure to pay costs.128  In many jurisdictions 
nationwide, individuals lose their driver’s licenses over unpaid fees and 
fines even when they simply cannot afford to pay this debt.129  Then, when 
they are found driving without a license out of necessity and lack of ade-
quate public transportation, they are prosecuted and jailed.130
A similar phenomenon occurs in the child support enforcement 
and probation contexts.  Noncustodial parents who owe child support, 
whether or not they have the income to make these payments, are often 
thrown in jail.131  In Georgia, for example, 3500 individuals were jailed 
org/2017/03/14/thousands-texans-any-moment-face-arrest-unpaid-fines [https://
perma.cc/NT7C-P83W].
122. Saki Knafo, The U.S. is Locking People Up for Being Poor, Huffpost (Feb. 14, 2014, 
11:21 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/debtors-prisons- report_n_4768320 
[https://perma.cc/V8SR-GDDU].
123. Id.
124. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, supra note 119, at 10; see also Matthew Shaer, How 
Cities Make Money by Fining the Poor, N.Y. Times Mag. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/magazine/cities-fine-poor-jail.html [https:// perma.
cc/CM7L-5WWA?type=image].
125. Debtors’ Prisons: Life Inside America’s For-Profit Justice System, Fines & Fees 
Justice Center (Aug. 16, 2016), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/
debtors-prisons-america-for-profit-justice-vice [https://perma.cc/8VUJ-HBTY].
126. See “Set up to Fail”: The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation 
on the Poor, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/ 
report/2018/02/20/set-fail/impact-offender-funded-private-probation-poor 
[https://perma.cc/X3KY-BXC8].
127. Id.
128. Casey Smith & Cary Aspinwall, Increasing Number Going to Jail for Not Pay-
ing Fines, Tulsa World, (November 3, 2013) https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/
local/increasing-number-going-to-jail-for-not-paying-fines/article_8b8d2229-
c7ad-5e7f-aea2-baeb13390880.html [https://perma.cc/VDS6-L74N].
129. See Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-by-State Analysis of 
Driver’s License Suspension Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, Legal Aid Jus-
tice Center (Fall 2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/
Driven-by-Dollars.pdf.
130. See Resources, Free to Drive, (Jan. 24, 2020) https://www.freetodrive.org/ 
resources/#page-content [https://perma.cc/TW6D-9E6W].
131. Matthew Clarke, Poor Parents Fail to Pay Child Support, Go to Jail, Prison 
97Democracy, if you can afforD it
in 2010 on the basis of unpaid child support.132  The prevalence of such 
incarcerations is unsurprising: Since 70 percent of arrears nationwide are 
owed by people earning less than $10,000 annually, many noncustodial 
parents find themselves facing jail time because they cannot afford their 
payments.133  In the probation context, paying fees is often an explicit 
condition of probation.134  When people fail to make their monthly pay-
ments, they may be considered to have committed a “technical violation” 
that warrants rearrest.135  In other circumstances, failure to make proba-
tion-related payments may be considered “contempt of court” and also 
sufficient to justify jail time.136
To be constitutionally sound, these debt-based incarcerations may 
occur only after a judge makes a finding of “willfulness.”137  This “will-
fulness” finding requires a court, before ordering nonpayment-based 
incarceration, to determine that a person has the present ability to pay.138 
If a person is truly unable to pay, the court cannot constitutionally order 
incarceration for nonpayment.139  The underlying rationale, as set forth 
most notably in Bearden v. Georgia and its progeny, is that a person can-
not be punished “solely because of his lack of financial resources.”140 
Jailing a person who is indigent for nonpayment is, by definition, violating 
this constitutional mandate.141
Notwithstanding this constitutional requirement, ability-to-pay 
determinations often fail to materialize or do not pass constitutional 
muster.  In some jurisdictions, judges purport to conduct ability-to-pay 
inquiries, but use proxies that render this process meaningless.  In Michi-
gan, for example, judges are encouraged to ask people how often they get 
Legal News (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/sep/2/
poor-parents-fail-pay-child-support-go-jail[https://perma.cc/NK6L-DKCC].
132. Frances Robes & Shaila Dewan, Skip Child Support.  Go to Jail.  Lose Job.  Re-
peat.  Skip Child Support.  Go to Jail.  Lose Job.  Repeat., N. Y. Times (April 
19, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-
lose-job-repeat.html [https://perma.cc/G4W7-GTQN].
133. Elaine Sorensen, Liliana Sousa & Simone G. Schaner, Assessing Child Support 
Arrears in Nine Large States and the Nation, Urban Institute (Jan. 14, 2009), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/29736/1001242- Assessing-
Child-Support-Arrears-in-Nine-Large-States-and-the-Nation.PDF.
134. See Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, The Marshall Project, 
(Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/debtors-prisons-
then-and-now-faq [https://perma.cc/V39D-V9HQ].
135. Id.
136. Set up to Fail, supra note 126.
137. See, e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) also requires that, absent the appointment 
of counsel for indigent noncustodial parents at civil contempt hearings for non-
payment of child support, a court must provide certain procedural safeguards to 
comply with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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manicures and even whether the manicures are regular, gel, or acrylic.142 
The wrong answer to these questions—or accidentally wearing the wrong 
sneakers—may be considered enough to make someone “able to pay” 
a LFO.  In other jurisdictions, judges explicitly reject the constitutional 
requirement to conduct these inquiries.143  In El Paso, Texas, for example, 
a man was jailed for twenty-one days because he could not pay his traf-
fic tickets.144  The judge never asked whether he had the money to pay 
and, when confronted about this, replied, “I’m not required by law to ask 
anything.”145
B. Causes of Jail-Based Disenfranchisement
As explained in Subpart III.A, our current criminal-legal system 
criminalizes poverty by maintaining wealth-based systems of detention 
and punishment and criminalizing behavior that is tied to lack of resourc-
es.  This system—much of which is designed to generate revenue for the 
government—traps people in a cycle of debt and incarceration and has 
driven the increase in the country’s jail population.  But state and local 
officials have failed to ensure that the three-quarters of a million people 
sitting in our jails on any given Election Day, most of whom are eligible 
voters, can register to vote, cast a ballot, and have it counted.  As the next 
Part explores, these failures materialize as lack of education of and from 
public officials, explicit restrictions on voting while in jail, and practical 
barriers to casting a ballot.  The result is massive disenfranchisement, dis-
proportionately borne by people who simply cannot afford their freedom 
and, consequently, cannot afford to vote.
1. Public Officials and Misinformation
A major cause of jail-based disenfranchisement is the prevalent 
misconception of state and local officials that people detained in jail are 
ineligible to vote.146  Likewise, the general public—including those de-
tained in jail—incorrectly assume that so long as they are detained, they 
cannot vote.147  This misconception and failure to educate has concrete 
142. Appendix A: Ability-to-Pay Checklists, Michigan Courts, https://courts. michigan.
gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/ Reports/ATP- 
AppendixA.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Kendall Taggart & Alex Campbell, In Texas It’s a Crime to Be Poor, 
Buzzfeed News (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
kendalltaggart/in-texas-its-a-crime-to-be-poor [https://perma.cc/2N6C-YPF5].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Danielle Root & Lee Doyle, Protecting the Voting Rights of Americans Detained 
While Awaiting Trial, Center for Am. Progress (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/08/23/455011/ protecting-
voting-rights-americans-detained-awaiting-trial [https://perma.cc/C7NQ-YD-
NX] ; see also Erika Wood and Rachel Bloom, De Facto Disenfranchisement, 
Brennan Center for Justice (2008).
147. Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote from the County Jail, Atlantic (Nov. 
4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/organizers-fight-
turn-out-vote-county-jails/574783 [https://perma.cc/2X52-5XAT].
99Democracy, if you can afforD it
effects: State and local election officials fail to create and maintain sys-
tems to allow people in jail to register to vote and to request and receive 
an absentee ballot or vote in person at the jail.148  Accordingly, local jail 
officials fail to ensure that their detained population has access to the 
ballot.  And when neither the eligible voters detained in jails nor their 
loved ones know that they in fact have the right to vote, they will make 
no efforts to register and vote.
There is no excuse for the ignorance of state and local officials on 
this point.  The United States Supreme Court held forty-five years ago in 
O’Brien v. Skinner that prohibiting eligible voters in jail from registering 
to vote and/or voting by absentee ballot violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.149  But the 
Court gave no guidance to state and local jurisdictions on how to comply 
with the law, so for the most part, they have failed to comply at all.
Misinformation persists despite advocates bringing suit in numer-
ous jurisdictions to enforce the rights of eligible voters in jail who were 
prevented from registering or casting a ballot.150  In Mississippi, for exam-
ple, a federal court in 1984 permanently enjoined the state from denying 
current and future eligible voters the right to vote by absentee ballot.151 
Yet today, neither the  Mississippi Secretary of State nor local election 
officials provide information to the public about jail voting, allowing the 
misconception of ineligibility to persist in Mississippi where officials rou-
tinely fail to safeguard the voting rights of jailed voters.152  Even in the 
handful jurisdictions that have taken steps to ensure eligible voters in jail 
are not disenfranchised, the processes vary widely, sometimes even from 
institution to institution, which contributes to the widespread confusion 
regarding whether and how jailed eligible voters can register and cast a 
148. Root & Doyle, supra note 146.
149. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); see also Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 
(1973).
150. See, e.g., Tate v. Collins, 496 F. Supp. 205, 210–11 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) (permanent-
ly enjoining Tennessee from preventing jailed eligible voters from voting via ab-
sentee ballot).
151. Murphree v. Winter, 589 F. Supp. 374, 382 (S.D. Miss. 1984).  In 1986, the absen-
tee ballot law at issue in Murphree was repealed, and in 1987, the absentee bal-
lot statute was codified as Section 23-15-627 of the Mississippi Code.  The new 
statute at Section 23-15-627 no longer includes the language that those who are 
“physically unable” to vote in person can request an absentee ballot but pro-
vides that a person who has a “temporary or permanent physical disability” may 
request an absentee ballot (one of thirteen excuses sufficient to vote by absen-
tee ballot in the current law).  Although Mississippi’s absentee ballot statute has 
undergone changes since the Murphree decision, the rationale behind Murphree 
and O’Brien applies with full force to the existing statute.
152. Nsombi Lambright, Maryum Jordan & Arekia Bennet, Pretrial detainees not con-
victed of crimes can vote, but Mississippi makes it impossible, Clarion Ledger (Nov. 
2, 2018), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/ columnists/2018/11/02/
pre-trial-detainees-mississippi-denied-right-vote/1845808002 [https://perma.cc/
F344-TL3N].
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ballot.153  In Louisiana, where jailed eligible voters are explicitly includ-
ed on the absentee ballot application, failure of officials to educate the 
public and provide meaningful registration and absentee ballot access 
has resulted in very few jailed voters successfully voting.154  The registrar 
of voters for Lafayette Parish, for example, noted that in her ten years as 
registrar, she has never counted a ballot from the parish jail.155
2. Explicit Barriers to Voting in Jail
Some jurisdictions have laws that make voting from jail an im-
possibility, either on the face of the law or as a direct effect of the law. 
Such restrictions are usually found in the state’s absentee ballot laws, 
and because many states require an absentee ballot to be mailed before 
an election takes places, voters detained after the deadline but before 
the election are disenfranchised.  In Ohio, for example, state law allows 
detained voters to request absentee ballots, but the law requires those 
detained in jail to request an absentee ballot before “twelve noon of the 
third day before the day of the election at which the ballot is to be vot-
ed.”156  Thus, in Ohio, no one arrested after close of business the Friday 
before an election (and kept in custody through the election) can vote 
by absentee ballot in Ohio.157  In New York State, as another example, 
the deadline for requesting an absentee ballot for 2019 was October 29, 
though the election was on November 4.158  The result is that anyone who 
is arrested after October 29 and is subsequently detained pretrial is ef-
fectively disenfranchised—even though they are constitutionally entitled 
to cast a ballot.
Although most states, including Ohio, have emergency ballot laws 
that allow voters who miss the absentee ballot deadline but cannot vote 
153. Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote from the County Jail, Atlantic (Nov. 
4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/organizers-fight-
turn-out-vote-county-jails/574783 [https://perma.cc/3B8M-9PJV]; see also Sec-
retary Merrill Responds to Inaccurate Alabama Political Reporter Op-Ed, Ala. 
Sec’y of State (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/newsroom/ secretary-
merrill-responds-inaccurate-alabama-political-reporter-op-ed [https://perma.cc/
X2BN-END4] (providing completely incorrect statement of Alabama’s felony 
disenfranchisement law and suggesting that people not convicted of crimes of 
moral turpitude lose their right to vote while incarcerated when, in fact, those 
people never lose their right to vote).
154. Lanie Lee Cook, Inmates awaiting trial have right to vote, but few do in La-
fayette, other Louisiana parishes, officials say, Acadiana Advocate (Nov. 13, 
2015), https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/politics/elections/article_
c90053b5-1804-5110-afa7-d76c4a18f702.html [https://perma.cc/W6RE-LXV9].
155. Id.
156. Ohio Rev. Code § 3509.08(A) (2012); see also Complaint, Mays v. Husted, 2:18-
cv-10376 (Nov. 6, 2018), available at https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/
files/2018-11/1_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/J478-EZQH].
157. Complaint, Mays v. Husted, supra note 156.
158. Voter Registration Deadlines, N. Y. State Bd. of Elections, https://www. elections.
ny.gov/VotingDeadlines.html [https://perma.cc/N5TF-C62P] (last visited Apr. 4, 
2020).
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in person on Election Day, most of these laws exclude people detained 
in jail awaiting trial from the list of eligible voters.159  Ohio’s law, for ex-
ample, allows certain individuals to request an absentee ballot by special 
application anytime between noon on Saturday before the election and 
3:00 PM  on Election Day.160  But this option is only available for people 
who are hospitalized, who have minor children hospitalized, or who have 
an unforeseen accident or illness after the absentee ballot application 
deadline has passed.161  Although this law is currently the subject of fed-
eral litigation,162 jailed voters should not have to bring suit in each state 
that fails to protect their right to vote.
3. Logistical and Practical Barriers to Voting in Jail
In addition to state laws creating explicit or constructive jail-based 
disenfranchisement, logistical and practical barriers also prevent eligible 
voters in jail from casting a ballot.  Some of the most challenging current 
barriers are: the inability for advocates to access jailed voters, the uncer-
tain nature of a jailed elector’s time in custody, and the failure of elected 
officials to create voting-related forms that consider jailed voters.
In the face of widespread government inaction to safeguard the vot-
ing rights of jailed eligible voters, voting rights advocates have attempted 
to fill the void and conduct voter registration and absentee ballot pro-
grams in jails.  While some organizations have had success, an advocate’s 
access to eligible voters in jail is at the sole discretion of jail officials, and 
many jail officials are less than accommodating.  Cook County Jail in Chi-
cago is one of only a few jails around the country that allow incarcerated 
eligible voters in the jail to register and vote in-person at the jail; but this 
change only came about because of months of advocacy by staff at the 
Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law who were able to spend 
every weekend registering and educating voters at the jail.163
Because voting from jail is a multistep process, advocates must have 
consistent access to the jail and those it houses to ensure that voters are 
completing each step and have assistance if needed.  And most regis-
tration forms, absentee ballot applications, and absentee ballots are not 
159. See Absentee Voting in Case of a Personal Emergency, Nat’l Conf. State Legis-
latures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee- voting-
in-case-of-a-personal-emergency.aspx [https://perma.cc/9MN3-DYP2] (last visit-
ed Oct. 26, 2019).
160. Ohio Rev. Code § 3509.8(B) (2012).  If the person is in the hospital in the coun-
ty where they vote, they can opt to have two election officials or a family mem-
ber pick up, deliver, and return the absentee ballot.  Id.  For those in the hospital 
outside of the county where they vote, the voter receives and returns the ballot 
by mail, as long as it is postmarked the day before the election.  Id.
161. Id.
162. Complaint, Mays v. Husted, supra note 156.
163. See La Risa Lynch, Ability to Vote Compromised for Thousands Behind Bars, 
Chicago Reporter (July 10, 2017), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/ability-to-
vote-compromised-for-thousands-behind-bars [https://perma.cc/TC8K-5F5G].
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written with jailed voters in mind.164  Determining the jailed elector’s 
address, for example, will typically require including their last place of 
residence165 to determine in which location the voter will vote and the 
jail’s address for mailing back an absentee ballot.166  In states that require 
an excuse to vote absentee, the absentee ballot applications do not clear-
ly indicate which category the jailed voter should select.  In Mississippi, 
for example, caselaw has held that an eligible voter held in jail can vote 
absentee because their detention constitutes a temporary disability,167 
which is an excuse to vote absentee and exempts the applicant from the 
requirement to have the application (and their ballot) notarized.168  But 
Mississippi’s absentee ballot application does not direct jailed voters to 
select the “temporary disability” option; as a result, voters in jail may fill 
out the application incorrectly or may not think they are able to vote 
at all.169  Finally, voters in jail may not be able to complete forms that 
require social security numbers or a copy of a picture ID if they do not 
have ready access to such information or documents.170  If jail officials 
prevent jailed voters from accessing the personal documents needed to 
complete these steps, registration and voting will not be possible.  Thus, 
the presence of voting rights advocates is critical for voters in the jail to 
complete each step correctly and anticipate problems.
For states or localities that provide access to registration or absen-
tee ballot applications in jails, absentee ballot deadlines may be hard to 
meet for those detained due to delays in processing mail in and out of 
jails.  In Louisiana, the absentee ballot application includes an option for 
incarcerated voters, but requires that the application be certified by the 
164. For example, in states that allow emergency absentee ballots, most do not in-
clude “incarceration” as an acceptable reason for an emergency absentee ballot. 
See Absentee Voting in Case of a Personal Emergency, supra note 159.
165. One population that faces particular challenges around jail voting is voters who 
are transient or experiencing homelessness.  Even if a state has a functional sys-
tem for voter registration and receiving absentee ballots in jail, essentially all 
states require a current address to complete voter registration or absentee bal-
lot applications.  While states and local jurisdictions vary greatly in their prac-
tices here, lack of a permanent “outside” address can create additional compli-
cations for jailed homeless and/or transient voters.  More research is needed to 
fully understand how widespread this issue is.
166. See, e.g., Advisory Cmte. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Barriers to Voting in 
Louisiana 24 (June 2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/08-20-LA-Voting-
Barriers.pdf.
167. See Murphree v. Winter, 589 F. Supp. 374.
168. Official Application for Absentee Elector’s Ballot, Miss. Sec’y of State, https://
www.sos.ms.gov/Elections-Voting/Documents/Absentee%20Voting%20
Forms17.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
169. See id.
170. See Barthel, supra note 153 (noting that because jail populations can skew 
younger, many eligible voters in jail are unfamiliar with voting processes, and 
advocates often encounter younger registrants who did not know their own So-
cial Security number).
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sheriff to be valid.171  Considering likely delays in mail received and sent 
from jails, this requirement adds further delay and may result in a jailed 
voter missing the absentee ballot application deadline, which is 4:30 PM 
four days before the election in Louisiana.172  Delays in processing mail 
in local jails means that jailed voters, in reality, face much earlier dead-
lines than other voters.  The uncertain timing of criminal cases may also 
interfere with the ability of jailed voters to vote.  For example, if a voter 
is registered to vote by an advocacy organization while in jail but is re-
leased prior to filling out an absentee ballot, the advocates will be unable 
to track those registered to ensure that they are able to vote.  Further, if 
a person is released from jail after requesting an absentee ballot, but be-
fore the ballot is mailed out to the jail, they will not receive the absentee 
ballot and may face challenges when trying to vote in person.173
While LFOs and “jail-based disenfranchisement” policies suppress 
voting through formal mechanisms and practical barriers, focusing on 
these explicit restrictions would understate the ways that a monetized 
criminal-legal system ultimately deters civic engagement.  The following 
Part therefore explores a second set of indirect ways that LFOs—and the 
process used to enforce these LFOs—may be suppressing voting even 
when an individual formally has access to the ballot.
III. The Democracy-Suppressing Effects of Pocketbook Policing
Even for individuals who are not formally disenfranchised either 
through debt-based voting restrictions or jail-based disenfranchise-
ment, criminal-legal debt may take another toll on their democratic 
engagement: “Pocketbook policing”—the use of a jurisdiction’s policing 
apparatus not to maximize safety, but to maximize revenue—increasingly 
drives policing decisions, causing disproportionate criminal-legal contact 
in certain neighborhoods and a perception that the government is sim-
ply bent on extorting poor Black and Latinx individuals.174  Empirical 
and ethnographic research increasingly suggests that contact with this 
revenue-focused system dampens voter turnout and civic participation 
generally.175
The following Part provides a brief overview of how fees and fines 
have increasingly built the “pocketbook policing” culture of today.  It will 
then present and explain the research on how this system is suppressing 
voter turnout.
171. Advisory Cmte. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 166.
172. Vote by Mail, La. Sec’y of State, https://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/
Vote/VoteByMail/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GD36-QR62] (last visit-
ed Oct. 27, 2019).
173. Advisory Cmte. U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 166, at 24–25.
174. Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral 
State, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 104, 817–833 (2010).
175. See id.
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A. Pocketbook Policing
Over the last thirty years and particularly the past decade, fines 
and fees have risen dramatically across the country, coinciding with an 
unprecedented jail and prison boom that has driven the soaring U.S. 
incarcerated population.176  This timing is not accidental: As jails, pris-
ons, probation departments, and court systems expanded due to rising 
incarceration, governments used fines and fees as an explicit strategy to 
cover these increased costs.177  Local governments, to meet the demand 
for new programs without raising taxes, began imposing more and more 
financial obligations on criminal defendants.  When the recession hit, this 
imperative increased: As state grants to courts and local governments 
fell, reflecting steep drops in tax revenue, judicial officers and policymak-
ers began using LFOs to fill this shortfall.178
The numbers tell the story of this transition: At every level of 
government, fees and fines have increased.  Since 2010, 48 states have 
increased fees in the criminal and civil systems.179  Since 1996, for exam-
ple, Florida has created twenty new categories of financial obligations 
and has increased fee amounts.180  This revenue focus creates an uncon-
stitutional conflict of interest, as was vindicated in the Cain case in New 
Orleans, because it distorts the purported neutrality of judicial deci-
sionmakers.181  In other cases, court fees are ultimately deposited into 
municipalities’ general funds.  In 2017, municipal courts in New Jersey 
collected $400 million in fines and fees, half of which padded munici-
palities’ general coffers.182  More broadly, states and local governments 
have increasingly used LFOs to fund their operations.  In Ferguson, 
Missouri, fees and fines came to comprise 13 percent of the overall mu-
nicipal budget.183  In some jurisdictions, this proportion is 30 percent or 
176. See Menendez supra note 13; see also Alana Semuels, The Fines and Fees 
That Keep Former Prisoners Poor, Atlantic (July 5, 2016), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/the-cost-of-monetary-sanctions-for- 
prisoners/489026 [https://perma/cc/6VT3-UDRJ].
177. See Patrick Liu et al, Nine Facts About Monetary Sanctions in the Crim-
inal Justice System (2019), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Bail-
Facts_20190314.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HJP-LMWA].
178. See id.
179. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 
19, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-
fees-punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/USX2-FKNF].
180. See Diller, supra note 16, at 7.
181. See Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624 (2017).
182. See New Jersey Courts, Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Munic-
ipal Court Operations, Fines, and Fees 12 (2018).
183. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department 9 
(2015).
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more.184  In Colorado, some courts obtain more than 50 percent of their 
funding from fees and fines.185
As state and local governments relied more heavily on fines and 
fees, they began structuring their operations to maximize revenue collec-
tion.  In Ferguson, Missouri, the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report 
painted a searing picture of this fee-collection culture.186  Between 2010 
and 2014, the Ferguson Police Department issued more than 90,000 cita-
tions and municipal violation summonses as a way to generate revenue 
that would fund city operations.187  The entire government became an 
apparatus to extract revenue.  As the Justice Department put it, the court 
did not act as a “neutral arbiter of the law” but instead used its authority 
to compel payment—and used this authority disproportionately against 
African Americans.188  The Police Executive Research Forum, after con-
ducting a survey that examined policing in St. Louis city and county, put it 
like this: “In many municipalities, policing priorities are driven not by the 
public safety needs of the community, but rather by the goal of generat-
ing large portions of the operating revenue for the local government.”189
Nationwide, the racial disparities of fines and fees collection are 
overwhelming.  Cities with large African American populations are most 
likely to levy heavy fines.190  Of the fifty cities that have the highest pro-
portion of fine-based revenues, the median size of the African American 
population—as measured by percentage—is over five times greater than 
the national median.191  In Washington State, Latinx receive higher fines 
than non-Latinx for similar offenses.192  A four-year analysis of parking 
ticket issuance in Las Vegas showed that more than two-thirds of the 
most-ticketed addresses in residential areas were located in the city’s 
traditionally Black and Latinx neighborhoods.193  And in Ferguson itself, 
184. See Dan Kopf,  The Overlooked Reason Why Some Cities Have Strained Re-
lationships with Cops,  Bus. Insider (July 11, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://static5. 
businessinsider.com/reason-for-strained-relationship-with-police-2016-7 [http:// 
perma.cc/EDY2-DCR5].
185. Editorial, Limit Cities’ Reliance on Revenue from Traffic Fines, Denver Post 
(May 15, 2015, 11:01 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/05/15/limit- cities-
reliance-on-revenue-from-traffic-fines [https://perma.cc/4CCD-QDT3].
186. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 183, at 7.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 3–4.
189. Police Exec. Research Forum, Overcoming the Challenges and Creating a 
Regional Approach to Policing in St. Louis City and County 2 (2015) https://
www.policeforum.org/assets/stlouis.pdf.
190. See Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, Priceonomics (Jun. 24, 2016), https://
priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america [https://perma.cc/Q6VK-YP4F].
191. Id.
192. See Katherine A. Beckett et al. The Assessment and Consequences of Legal 
Financial Obligations in Washington State 2 (2008).
193. See James DeHaven, Las Vegas’ Low-Income Areas Hit Harder by Park-
ing Tickets, Analysis Shows, L.V. Rev. J. (Jan. 17, 2015, 4:50 PM), https://www. 
reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/las-vegas-low-income-areas-hit-harder-
by-parking-tickets-analysis-shows [https://perma.cc/9DGY-ZWNB].
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the arrest data are stark: The Justice Department found that African 
Americans accounted for 85 percent of vehicle stops, 90 percent of cita-
tions, and 93 percent of arrests, despite comprising only 67 percent of the 
population.194
This racialized system of “pocketbook policing” is having dev-
astating effects on families, especially Black families, nationwide.195 
Also, pocketbook policing is negatively affecting U.S. democracy by 
suppressing civic engagement.196  As jurisdictions increase crimi-
nal-legal contact to levy fines and fees, they distort people’s views of 
government generally and, as this Part argues, their propensity for civic 
engagement.
B. Voter Turnout Research
An increasing body of research suggests that even brief contact with 
the criminal-legal system, such as short periods of incarceration, may be 
linked to reduced voter turnout in the future.  Ariel White, a professor at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, found the following results in 
a project examining Harris County, Texas: As compared to people who 
were not jailed, people jailed on misdemeanor charges—even if such 
incarceration lasted only a short time—were a few percentage points 
less likely to vote.197  Among Black individuals, the effect was markedly 
stronger: Black individuals’ postrelease voting participation fell from 26 
percent to 13 percent.  White estimated that if this effect were extended 
nationwide, jail incarceration may be dissuading 100,000 to 150,000 eligi-
ble Black voters from participating each cycle.
These findings echo related work by Vesla Weaver, a professor at 
Yale University, who has explored how criminal-legal engagement in-
teracts with civic participation.  Weaver found that people who were 
convicted in adult court but did not serve time were 8 percent less like-
ly to vote.198  People who were convicted in adult court and served less 
than a year were 16 percent less likely to vote.199  And people who were 
convicted in adult court and served more than a year were 29 percent 
less likely to vote.200  Importantly, Weaver found that the effects of incar-
ceration increased as criminal-legal contact increased, with incarceration 
itself having the greatest effect.201  Her findings are particularly significant 
194. U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 183, at 4.
195. See generally Kopf, supra note 190.
196. See Vesla M. Weaver et al., Detaining Democracy?  Criminal Justice and Amer-
ican Civic Life, 651 Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 6 (2014).  See 
Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement?  The Demobilizing Effects of 
Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293, 311 (2019).
197. See Ariel White, Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement?  The Demobilizing Effects 
of Brief Jail Spells on Potential Voters, 113 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293, 311(2019).  See 
Weaver & Lerman, supra note 174.
198. See Weaver & Lerman, supra note 174.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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because they dwarf the effects of other factors, such as unemployment 
(less than 3 percent decline) or receiving welfare (7 percent decline), 
which are often associated with reduced turnout.202  Further, Weaver 
found similar, though smaller declines when using a different dataset.203
Research also suggests that the criminal-legal system may be 
linked to lower voting even when people simply reside in high-incarcer-
ation communities or have incarcerated kin.  Traci Burch, a professor at 
Northwestern, examined the ways that incarceration rates affect voting 
participation at the community level.204  In her work, Burch found that the 
density of community supervision and incarceration affected both vot-
ing turnout and civic participation.205  In North Carolina neighborhoods 
with high concentrations of imprisonment and community supervision, 
people are 50 percent less likely to vote than people who live in neigh-
borhoods that have no individuals imprisoned, even when controlling 
for race, residential mobility, poverty, crime, county, and citizenship.206  In 
addition, Burch found that people residing in these neighborhoods are 
more than 38 percent less likely to protest, sign petitions, and otherwise 
partake in activities that are considered evidence of civil and political 
participation.207  Along a similar vein, Hedwig Lee, Lauren Porter, and 
Megan Comfort found that the children of incarcerated parents are 332 
percent less likely to vote.208  They are also less likely to trust the govern-
ment and undertake community service.209  This research is significant 
because it extends “jail-based disenfranchisement” and felony disenfran-
chisement to individuals who have no criminal convictions and are not 
actually incarcerated: Individuals who simply reside in high-incarceration 
communities or have loved ones who move through the system are neg-
atively affected.
Recent work is still exploring whether these effects are causal or 
merely driven by underlying factors that result in selection bias.210  Re-
gardless of causality, though, the results should give some pause: The 
United States is increasingly a country of two tiers—one comprised of 
202. See id. at 2.
203. When using the “Add Health” dataset, Weaver found that police stops triggered 
an 8 percent drop in the probability that a person will vote, that arrest history 
triggered a 16 percent drop, and that incarceration triggered a 22 percent drop. 
Id. at 11.
204. See Traci R. Burch, Effects of Imprisonment and Community Supervision on 
Neighborhood Political Participation in North Carolina, 651 Annals of the Am. 
Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci., 184–201 (2014).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 186.
207. See id. at 186.
208. Hedwig Lee et al., Consequences of Family Member Incarceration: Impacts on 
Civic Participation and Perceptions of the Legitimacy and Fairness of Govern-
ment, 651 Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci. 44, 53 (2014).
209. See id.
210. Alan S. Gerber et al., Does Incarceration Reduce Voting?  Evidence about the Po-
litical Consequences of Spending Time in Prison, 79 J. of Pol. 1130 (2017).
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those never incarcerated, who face no barriers to democratic engagement, 
and the other comprised of the over-incarcerated and democratical-
ly isolated.
C. Understanding the Impacts on Voter Turnout
The literature provides two primary theories to help understand 
why the criminal-legal system may suppress civic participation.
The first theory posits that criminal-legal contact reduces trust 
in state institutions.211  In their work, Christopher Muller and Daniel 
Schräge indicate that people living in neighborhoods with high rates of 
incarceration more often view criminal-legal institutions as biased and il-
legitimate.212  This erosion of public trust may reduce peoples’ democratic 
participation, as they no longer see the state as fundamentally fair.213 
Hedwig Lee, Lauren Porter, and Megan Comfort reach a similar conclu-
sion, finding that the corrections system provides a “powerful mechanism 
for political socialization”—not just for the people incarcerated, but for 
their families.214  In some communities, “people have their only real con-
tact with government” in “hostile confrontations” involving the police.215 
These negative experiences, Weaver writes in her piece examining this 
topic, become a “bridge” to other government entities: Because people 
see the government as “one big system” rather than distinct components, 
their negative experiences with the criminal-legal system give them a 
“broader cynicism about government authorities as a whole.”216
Weaver, in her recent research using information from “Portals” 
that captured conversations about people’s experiences involving police, 
finds that fines and fees are an essential component of this negative so-
cialization.217  In many dialogues, participants in the Portals noted that 
the system was structured to “make money off of them” and that “their 
communities endured disproportionate taxation and financial drain.”218 
Their statements reflected a clear belief that the criminal-legal apparatus 
is structured not to advance justice, but to make a dime.219  One man, 
211. Christopher Muller et al., Mass Imprisonment and Trust in the Law, 651 Annals 
of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Sci., 139–158 (2014), [https://perma.cc/FWY4-
75HQ].
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Lee et al., supra note 208.
215. Weaver et al., supra note 196 at 819.
216. See id.
217. Natalie Weber, Speaker Critiques Policing Methods, The Notre Dame Observer, 
Mar. 22, 2017, at 1.
218. Amar Bakshi et al., Portals to Politics: Perspectives on Policing from the Grass-
roots at 10 (Nov. 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York 
University School of Law), [https://perma.cc/DH5S-96UA].
219. See id.  Different statements included the following:
“We’re nothing but a check to them.”
“They lock people up to make money.”
“Jailing is big business here.”
“We’re cheaper to imprison than educate.”
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whose statement Weaver transcribed in full, captured his perspective on 
the criminal-legal system as follows:
We’re being locked up and held at a ransom.  I call that a ransom, not 
a bail because this is a system that’s created for the rich to get richer, 
you understand what I’m saying?  We’re not the rich . . . .  I feel as 
though that system is created, why?  To generate more money for, for 
commissaries, for my family to spend more money on commissary 
food and other families for other inmates who are in there . . . I have 
a four-year-old son.  I don’t wish to spend my money on commissar-
ies.  I don’t wish [to pay] lawyer’s fees, and court fees, and pawns, and 
things like that.  No, I want to give this money to my son.
Beyond the heightened distrust, a second theory posits that crim-
inal-legal contact often teaches people negative lessons about their 
political efficacy.220  According to Weaver, criminal-legal contact involves 
a passive interaction in which individuals are “objectified and dependent” 
as opposed to equal participants.221  This hierarchical and authoritarian 
relationship is a “one way transaction” that leaves individuals doubting 
their capacity to make political change or affect decisionmaking.222  Such 
an impression has a dampening effect on voting rights and civic engage-
ment generally, as the political system is no longer viewed as a possible 
avenue for effecting change.
IV. Policy Reforms
A. Global: Decarcerate
Changing the criminal-legal paradigm to reduce incarceration and 
punishment-focused responses, namely through upfront, noncarceral in-
vestments that prevent criminal-legal involvement in the first place, is 
the only way to address fully the ways that the criminal-legal system is 
undermining civic participation.  Although this Article cannot address 
comprehensively the sweeping reforms needed to transform the crimi-
nal-legal system, it identifies a few reforms that will particularly address 
the financialization of the criminal-legal system.
First, reforms must include abolition of the many fines, fees, and 
costs that were described in Subparts I.A and IV.A.  These fees, which 
often are earmarked to fund governments’ general operations, are a re-
gressive source of public finance—both because flat fees impact poorer 
people disproportionately and because more than 80 percent of court-in-
volved individuals are indigent.223  These fees also create the profit-motive 
that entices private actors to enter the criminal-legal system.  Given the 
ability to charge direct-to-consumer fees, private companies have access 
220. Weaver et al., supra note 196.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Defending Communities in Service—A New AmeriCorps VISTA Project through 
NLADA, Nat. Leg. Aid & Def. Ass’n, http://www.nlada.org/vista [https://perma.
cc/EH2P-7JJD].
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to a revenue model that can prove lucrative.224  The provision of prepaid 
cards that prisons can use to make calls, for example, is a $1.2 billion busi-
ness.225  This revenue model, besides extracting money from those who 
can least afford it, creates perverse incentives for public policy: Public 
officials often choose the service provider that will provide the best kick-
backs while companies are incentivized to extract more money—even 
when this extraction is hurting families and setting back reentry goals.226 
For example, private providers of probation services charge people not 
only supervision fees, but also fees for electronic monitoring and for each 
drug test that a person takes.227  As jurisdictions move toward fee abo-
lition, states and the federal government will need to critically rethink 
how they fund courts and government operations.  Centralized funding 
disconnected from direct-to-consumer fees must be provided.
Second, jurisdictions must dramatically reduce their reliance on 
fines and, where fines exist, ensure that they are proportional to indi-
vidual financial circumstances and the offense.  “Pocketbook policing” 
exists largely because local governments are levying fines to raise rev-
enue.  If municipalities cannot keep the revenue collected from fines or 
can keep the revenue only to a certain limit that is fixed by a cap, they 
will have less incentive to view policing activities as a revenue-gener-
ation enterprise.  Missouri passed a version of this “cap” idea in 2015, 
following the activism in Ferguson, Missouri.  The legislation limited how 
much money municipalities could collect from traffic fines, setting this 
ceiling for St. Louis County at 12.5 percent of local revenue and at 20 
percent elsewhere.228  This number was likely not low enough to achieve 
the results desired, but provides a baseline on which future efforts can 
build.  Other jurisdictions can implement more aggressive reforms that 
further reduce local governments’ potential reliance on fines and fees. 
The second reform, introducing the idea of proportionality, addresses the 
regressive nature of flat assessments.  Under proportional models, such as 
the “day fine” model used in Western Europe, people are assessed fines in 
a manner that reflects their incomes.229  Each offense is assigned a certain 
224. Peter Wagner, Uncovering Securus’ Profits, Prison Policy Initiative Blog (June 
19, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/06/19/securus-profits [https://
perma.cc/JQG4-MK5S].
225. Katie Rose Quandt, LawsuitReveals How Tech Companies Profit off the Pris-
on-Industrial Complex, Think Progress, (February 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/
CZ87-USBL].
226. Alicia Bannon et al., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Criminal Justice Debt: A Bar-
rier to Reentry (2010).
227. First Am. Compl., McNeil et al. v. Comty. Prob. Servs., LLC et al., No. 
1:18CV00033 (M.D. Tenn. Jul. 13, 2018), 2019 WL 298474.
228. Mitch Smith, Missouri Lawmakers Limit Revenue From Traffic Fines in St. 
Louis Area, N.Y. Times (May 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/
us/ missouri-lawmakers-agree-to-limit-revenue-from-traffic-fines.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ND78-3AKS].
229. Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, Crime and Just. 12, 49–98 (1990).
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number of punishment units that indicate the severity of the behavior.230 
Then, an arrested person’s fine is equal to these “punishment units” mul-
tiplied by how much the person earns, on average, in a single day.231  This 
individualized fine model is both an escape from the affordability trap, 
where people are charged fines that they will never have the resources 
to pay, and a reduced incentive to target low-income individuals as rev-
enue sources.
Third, jurisdictions must enact reforms that end the financial con-
ditioning of pretrial freedom.  Such reforms should include, at least, the 
abolition or extreme deprioritization of money-bail and other financial 
conditions (e.g., required payments for electronic monitors).  Although 
many jurisdictions have pursued reforms requiring ability-to-pay deter-
minations, these reforms often prove inadequate, difficult to implement, 
and even prone to entrench the legitimacy of fee fine-based systems.232 
Variability between different jurisdictions’ ability-to-pay assessments 
creates vast discrepancies, meaning that a person’s fortunes may turn sub-
stantially on where she is arrested.233  Ability-to-pay reforms also can fail 
to address the issues surrounding commercial bail, as bail bonds agencies 
may continue playing a crucial role in providing upfront cash—for nonre-
fundable 10 percent premiums that the arrested individuals will never get 
back.234  Given the millions that the money-bail system is currently ex-
tracting from low-income and Black communities, addressing money-bail 
injustice is an essential starting place to end people’s perceptions that the 
criminal-legal system is an unfair mechanism for extracting capital.
B. Addressing Debt-Based Voting Restrictions
The surest way to eliminate the impact of wealth on access to the 
ballot for people with convictions is to abolish felony disenfranchise-
ment.  Right now, only two states—Maine and Vermont—allow all 
people with convictions to vote.235  But there is good reason for that to 
change.  Depriving people with convictions of the right to vote does not 
serve our criminal justice system, but undermines it.  Evidence suggests 
that voting rights restoration improves reentry and reduces recidivism.236 
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determinations are 
Inadequate to Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 175 (2019).
233. See id. at 202–05.
234. Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., When Bail Feels Less Like Freedom, More like 
Extortion, N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/31/us/
bail-bonds-extortion.html [https://perma.cc/6UAU-3SKB].
235. Can’t Pay, Can’t Vote, supra note 7, at 7.
236. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen et al., Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Ev-
idence from a Community Sample, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 193 (2004); Fl. 
Parole Comm’n, Status Update: Restoration of Civil Rights’ (RCR) Cases 
Granted 2009 and 2010, (2011). https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/ reports/2009-
2010ClemencyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2MT-FN83].
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Progress in this direction is marching forward.  The District of Columbia 
is poised to restore the voting rights of all people who have convictions.237 
Likewise, last term, New Mexico considered a complete reenfranchise-
ment bill238 and advocates in New Jersey are similarly seeking complete 
rights restoration.239  These measures will benefit thousands of individ-
uals, particularly in the Black and Latinx communities that have been 
disproportionately affected by felony disenfranchisement.  Nationwide, 1 
in every 13 African Americans lacks voting rights because of felony dis-
enfranchisement; among non-Black individuals, this number is 1 in 56.240
But states can take important steps short of abolishing felony dis-
enfranchisement to ensure that wealth does not pose a barrier to the 
ballot box.  Absent abolition, the most effective way to ensure that in-
ability to pay does not preclude ability to vote is to restore voting rights 
automatically upon release from incarceration because current forms of 
postincarceration supervision are inextricably bound up with legal debt, 
as discussed in Part I.  Not only is automatic restoration easier to adminis-
ter and on stronger constitutional footing, it is sound policy for everyone. 
As noted above, rights restoration is a public good that reduces racial 
disparities in voting access, affirms the dignity of returning citizens, and 
eliminates the modern-day poll tax.
States are slowly moving in this direction.  Both Colorado and 
Nevada adopted automatic restoration statutes in 2019.241  Absent auto-
matic restoration upon release from prison, states that condition rights 
restoration on completion of probation or parole must introduce policies 
that ensure individuals are never kept on supervision due to unpaid legal 
debt and introduce robust and easy to access waiver programs for those 
who cannot afford to pay.  Similarly, states that explicitly condition voting 
rights restoration on payment of outstanding legal financial obligations 
must eliminate those requirements and introduce the programs described 
above.  Governors in states where the Legislature refuses to act can also 
use their clemency powers to achieve many of the aims described above, 
albeit on a more temporary basis.242
Absent such steps, states will continue to violate the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s mandate in Harper that “[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is 
237. See Fenit Nirappil, Bill Would Let Felons Vote While in Prison, Wash. Post, June 
4, 2019, 2019 WLNR 17074662.
238. H.B. 57, 2019 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019).
239. N.J. Inst. for Soc. Justice, 1844 No More (2017), https://www.njisj.org/1844no-
morereport2017 [https://perma.cc/W6KW-UXP6].
240. Chung, supra note 22.
241. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., Restoration of Voting Rights for Felons, (Oct. 
14, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-vot-
ing-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/T9WN-5WCM].
242. See, e.g., Relating to the Restoration of Civil Rights for Convicted Felons, Ky. 
Exec. Order No. 2019-003 (Dec. 12, 2019); Restoring the Right to Vote for New 
Yorkers on Parole, N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018); Iowa Exec. Order 
No. 42 (July 4, 2005).
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not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the elector-
al process.”
C. Addressing Jail-Based Disenfranchisement
To ensure access to the ballot for anyone detained in jail who wish-
es to vote, state and local election officials must begin to include detained 
eligible voters as their constituency.  Election officials must take affir-
mative steps to remove the myriad barriers to registering and casting a 
ballot while held in jail.
1. Let Jails Serve as Polling Locations
The only way to ensure that no eligible voter detained in jail is dis-
enfranchised is for states to allow and implement same day, in-person 
registration and voting in local jails.  States should pass legislation requir-
ing that jails serve as polling locations, while reforming voting eligibility 
so that jailed voters are registered in their home precinct and not at the 
jail address.  Where states have not enacted this policy, jail officers and 
other actors should work together to implement jail-by-jail reforms.  In 
Cook County Jail in Chicago, for example, months of advocacy efforts led 
the county clerk’s office, volunteers, and jail officials to create in-jail poll-
ing places—one for men and one for women.243  These solutions require 
cooperation from all parties involved, including state and local officials, 
particularly election officials, and jail staff.244
2. Amend Absentee and Emergency Ballot Laws 
to Enfranchise Detained Voters
Unless and until states and local jurisdictions allow jails to serve as 
polling locations and ensure robust participation by local election and 
jail officials, jailed voters’ access to the ballot will remain through states’ 
absentee and emergency ballot laws.  Yet many states’ absentee ballot 
laws contain deadlines for mailing back applications and absentee bal-
lots that make compliance impossible for voters in jail.245  And although 
at least thirty-eight states permit emergency absentee ballots, few state 
emergency ballot laws apply to voters held in jail awaiting trial.246
243. See Lynch, supra note 163.
244. See Campaign Legal Center, Letter to Harris County, TX on Jail Polling Lo-
cation Initiative (Sept. 23, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/document/letter-har-
ris-county-tx-jail-polling-location-initiative-0 [https://perma.cc/FVZ4-W677] 
(urging judge and county commissioners’ court to move forward with previous-
ly-approved plan to turn Harris County Jail into polling location and provide 
voting machines to the eligible voters incarcerated there).
245. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-
Mail and other Voting at Home Options, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-
and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/UX47-LRUZ] 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2020); Absentee Ballot Deadlines, Vote.org, https://www.
vote.org/absentee-ballot-deadlines [https://perma.cc/WXB7-FRUW] (last visit-
ed Oct. 26, 2019).
246. See Absentee Voting in Case of a Personal Emergency, supra note 159.
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States should revise their absentee and emergency ballot laws to 
include eligible voters in jail and impose no deadlines that will be im-
possible or unrealistic for jailed voters.  In addition, absentee ballots and 
applications must have clear instructions and impose no requirements 
(such as notarization) that jailed voters cannot complete.  For example, 
in New York, voters detained in jail or confined in prison for a nonfelony 
conviction can apply for an absentee ballot by mail.247  The application 
can be postmarked by the seventh day prior to the election or delivered 
in person by the day before the election.248  The voted absentee ballot 
must be postmarked by the day before the election and received no later 
than seven days after the election.249  Emergency ballot laws must provide 
for absentee ballots to be requested, received, and mailed in by voters de-
tained in jail between the deadline to apply and the election.
3. Increase Public Awareness of Jail Voting Rights, Educational 
Outreach to Jails, and Participation with Voter Registration 
Drives
Even with positive legislative and administration reform, the ability 
of jailed eligible voters to vote requires supportive jail administrators 
and election officials to implement reforms and help facilitate voter ed-
ucation and registration drives.250  In Alabama, for example, after years 
of effort by voting rights activists to clarify which felonies are disenfran-
chising under the state’s incomprehensible felony disenfranchisement 
law and provide a real path for restoration, the state finally recognizes 
the right of jailed (and some incarcerated) voters to vote while incarcer-
ated.251  But the state refuses to meaningfully implement these changes 
to ensure access to the franchise from jail (or prison), and activists—led 
by The Ordinary People Society—must continue extensive outreach and 
247. NY State Bd. of Elections, Absentee Voting, The Official Website of New 
York State, https://www.elections.ny.gov/VotingAbsentee.html [https://perma.
cc/G6S7-9BNB] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019).
248. Id.  An eligible absentee voter may also request and absentee ballot by sending 
a letter to their county board of elections.
249. NY State Bd. of Elections, New York State Absentee Ballot Application 
(2015).
250. Illinois Jail Allows In-Person Voting, The Sentencing Project: Disenfranchise-
ment News (July 20, 2017) https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/5426 [https://
perma.cc/9ZLX-WYBJ]; see also Barthel, supra note 147.  See generally ACLU 
& Right to Vote, Voting While Incarcerated: A Tool Kit for Voting Rights 
Advocates (2005) https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ votingrights/ 
votingwhileincarc_20051123.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBC4-43YW].
251. Ala. State Advisory Commm to the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights’, Access to 
Voting in Alabama: A Summary of Testimony received by the Alabama Ad-
visory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights 16–21 
(2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/08-08-AL-Voting-Access.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CSH8-QELJ] (citing SOS Merrill’s testimony regarding voting while 
incarcerated).
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education to make voting an option for those held in Alabama’s prisons 
and jails.252
Registration drives are a key to ensuring access to the ballot is not 
denied to jailed voters; if those in jail cannot register to vote, changes 
in a state’s absentee and emergency ballot laws will be meaningless.  In 
Los Angeles County, a key component to successful registration drives 
has been training local officials—sheriff’s deputies, public defenders, 
probation officers, reentry personnel—and other community groups to 
understand California’s election laws and assist people in jail with filling 
out registration forms.253
To fully dismantle jail-based disenfranchisement, reforms in policy 
and practice are insufficient.  Public officials—state and county election 
officials and local sheriffs—must (1) provide accurate and consistent 
information on the process for voting while in jail to the public, jail offi-
cials, and those detained; (2) create voter registration and absentee ballot 
programs inside jails (and prisons in states where not all felonies are dis-
enfranchising) conducted by a voting coordinator inside the jail;254 and 
(3) ensure that advocates seeking to conduct registration and/or absen-
tee ballot drives have the full support of election and jail officials and can 
access those detained in jail year-round.  In addition, state Secretaries 
of State, election officials, and jail officials should design and implement 
comprehensive programs to make election-related information avail-
able.  This information dissemination should include information not 
only about the election and candidates, but also about political events, 
particularly events relating to the criminal-legal system.  Debates and 
the news should be made available wherever possible.  In addition, jails 
should make civic education and related programming available to the 
maximum extent possible.
4. Address Civic Disengagement
Unlike debt-based voting restrictions and voting access within jails, 
the civic engagement-related effects of LFOs and pocketbook policing 
lack simple, targeted fixes: The United States will not address this issue 
without addressing the broad criminalization of poverty.  In seeking these 
changes, though, subtle differences in advocacy approaches may dimin-
ish the negative “educative effects” of the current system: Centering 
reform efforts in those communities that have been directly impacted, 
252. Greg Garrison, Kenneth Glasgow: Al Sharpton’s Brother Promotes Voting Rights 
for Inmates, Felons, AL.com (June 28, 2019), https://www.al.com/news/2019/06/
kenneth-glasgow-al-sharptons-brother-promotes-voting-rights-for-inmates- 
felons.html [https://perma.cc/S6GE-4V6Q].
253. Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote from the County Jail, Atlantic (Nov. 
4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/11/organizers-fight-
turn-out-vote-county-jails/574783 [https://perma.cc/69GL-57W2].
254. See, e.g., L.A. CTY. Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Voting While In-
carcerated (2017) https://www.lavote.net/docs/rrcc/documents/Voting-While- 
Incarcerated.pdf?v=1 [https://perma.cc/2D6X-BWGL].
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as occurred with the successful Amendment 4 campaign, may take a step 
toward blunting the civic engagement-related impacts.255
Although discussions about policy advocacy often privilege polit-
ical expediency only, recent years have seen an increase in groups that 
are directly led by and center people who have been directly impacted 
by incarceration and other issues.256  These conversations are driven not 
only by an acknowledgment that people who are directly impacted by an 
issue—whether that issue is incarceration, sexual assault, gun violence, 
or whatever else—are the most powerful and efficacious spokespeople 
on their issue, but also by an awareness that the advocacy process itself 
can have empowering effects.  If the literature discussed in this Article is 
correct, people who are directly impacted often disengage because they 
feel alienated and powerless vis-à-vis the system.  A system so lacking in 
basic fairness, they come to believe, cannot possible be one that would 
respect their voices.  Channeling these frustrations and negative experi-
ences into reform efforts may become a powerful, long-lasting antidote 
to the sense that civic engagement will not yield real results.  In this sense, 
the impacted individual-led Amendment 4 campaign in Florida may pro-
vide a blueprint not only for making substantive policy change, but also 
for addressing the disenfranchising effects of the carceral system itself.
Conclusion
Over the next few years, we are likely to see continued campaigns 
that seek to dismantle felony-based disenfranchisement laws.  These 
campaigns are ultimately the surest way to address money-based vot-
ing restrictions and ensure that all individuals can cast a ballot.  But, we 
should be mindful that these campaigns take time and that, at this exact 
moment, thousands of people nationwide are being disenfranchised 
simply because they cannot pay a monetary sum.  Advocates should 
consider addressing these specific barriers when doing state, local, and 
federal advocacy.  In addition, we should be mindful that even full reen-
franchisement will not avoid all of the ways that the criminal-legal system 
is suppressing voter turnout: To ensure that all communities are heard 
equally, we must address the underlying inequities in the American crim-
inal-legal system and, as we do so, center the voices of those individuals 
and communities that have been most impacted.
255. Frances Robles, 1.4 Million Floridians with Felonies Win Long-Denied Right to 
Vote, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/ florida-
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256. See, e.g., Just Leadership USA, Florida Rights Restoration Coalition, Dream 
Corps, Initiate Justice, National Council for Incarcerated and Formerly Incar-
cerated Women and Girls, etc.
